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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the potential benefits of
the massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) enabled het-
erogeneous cloud radio access network (C-RAN) in terms of the
secrecy and energy efficiency (EE). In this network, both remote
radio heads (RRHs) and massive MIMO macrocell base stations
are deployed and soft fractional frequency reuse is adopted to mit-
igate the intertier interference. We first examine the physical layer
security by deriving the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy out-
age probability. Our results reveal that the use of massive MIMO
and C-RAN can greatly improve the secrecy performance. For
C-RAN, a large number of RRHs achieves high area ergodic se-
crecy rate and low-secrecy outage probability, due to its powerful
interference management. We find that for massive MIMO aided
macrocells, having more antennas and serving more users improves
secrecy performance. Then, we derive the EE of the heterogeneous
C-RAN, illustrating that increasing the number of RRHs signifi-
cantly enhances the network EE. Furthermore, it is indicated that
allocating more radio resources to the RRHs can linearly increase
the EE of RRH tier and improve the network EE without affecting
the EE of the macrocells.
Index Terms—Energy efficiency, heterogeneous cloud radio ac-
cess network (C-RAN), massive MIMO, physical layer security,
soft fractional frequency reuse (S-FFR).
I. INTRODUCTION
A S a new mobile network architecture consisting of remoteradio heads (RRHs) and baseband units (BBUs), cloud
radio access network (C-RAN) can deal with large-scale con-
trol/data processing much more efficiently. The rationale behind
this is that baseband processing is centralized and coordinated
among sites in the centralized BBU pool, which reduces the
capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure
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(OPEX) of the networks [1]. Massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) is another key technology that promises out-
standing spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE).
In massive MIMO antenna systems, base stations (BSs) are
equipped with large antenna arrays to support a large num-
ber of users in the same time-frequency domain [2]. Among
other emerging technologies such as device-to-device commu-
nications, full duplex radios, and millimeter wave, etc., C-RAN
and massive MIMO are identified as promising 5G technologies
[3]–[5].
Driven by its high SE and EE, C-RAN has recently received
tremendous attention from both industry and academia [6], [7].
For instance, a group of single-antenna RRHs were considered
to form a distributed antenna array, and two downlink trans-
mission strategies namely best RRH selection and distributed
beamforming were examined in terms of outage probability in
[7]. Most recently in [8], user-centric association in a multi-
tier C-RAN was proposed, in which the RRH that had the best
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was scheduled to serve the user.
Compared to [7], downlink transmission in the C-RAN with a
group of multi-antenna RRHs was investigated in [9]. In the
work of [9], maximal ratio transmission and transmit antenna
selection were adopted at the RRHs, and the outage probability
was derived by considering several transmission schemes such
as RRH selection and distributed beamforming.
Heterogeneous C-RAN is a new paradigm by integrat-
ing cloud computing with heterogeneous networks (HetNets)
[10], [11]. In heterogeneous C-RAN, severe inter-tier interfer-
ence is coordinated for the enhancement of SE and EE. The
architecture of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO is en-
visioned as an appealing solution, since none of these techniques
can solely achieve the 5G targets [4], [10]. In [10], the oppor-
tunities and challenges for heterogenous C-RAN with massive
MIMO were discussed, and it was mentioned that the proper
densities of the massive MIMO macrocell BSs (MBSs) and
RRHs in the networks should be addressed. While the sig-
nificance of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO has
been highlighted in the prior works [6], [10], more research
efforts should be devoted to proper characterization of this
combination.
Although C-RAN can effectively mitigate the inter-RRH in-
terference by using interference management techniques such
as coordinated multi-point (CoMP), the inter-tier interference
between the RRHs and MBSs may be problematic in the
heterogeneous C-RAN, due to the limited radio resources.
Soft fractional frequency reuse (S-FFR) is viewed as an ef-
ficient inter-tier interference coordination approach. In [11],
S-FFR was considered in the heterogeneous C-RAN to both
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mitigate the inter-tier interference and enhance the spectrum
efficiency.
Recent developments have showed physical layer security
as an innovative solution for safeguarding wireless networks.
The rationale behind this is to exploit the randomness inher-
ent in wireless channels such as fading or artificial noise, etc.
in order to transmit information confidentially [12]. In contrast
to traditional cryptographic approaches, physical layer secu-
rity based techniques do not rely on computational complexity
and have very good scalability [13]. The emergence of mas-
sive MIMO also introduces new opportunities for providing
physical layer security, e.g., [13]–[15]. In particular, in [14],
matched filter precoding and artificial noise generation were
considered to secure downlink transmission in a multicell mas-
sive MIMO system in the presence of an eavesdropper. Subse-
quently in [15], passive eavesdropping and active attacks were
investigated in massive MIMO systems with physical layer
security, which illustrates that passive eavesdropping has lit-
tle effect on the secrecy capacity for the case of considering
only one single-antenna eavesdropper. While these recent con-
tributions certainly laid a solid foundation in massive MIMO
systems with physical layer security, such a research area is
still far from being well understood. The research on phys-
ical layer security in the C-RAN is also in its infancy, and
we believe it is a new highly rewarding candidate for phys-
ical layer security due to at least the following two crucial
factors:
1) Low-power RRHs are densely placed in C-RAN [1] so
the distance between user and its serving RRH is short,
which decreases the risk of information leakage.
2) The inter-RRH interference is mitigated in the C-RAN.
As such, all other RRHs can act as “friendly jammers” to
confound the eavesdroppers [16]–[18].
Thus, massive MIMO and C-RAN offer a wealth of opportu-
nities at the physical layer to secure communication.
Motivated by the aforementioned background, in this paper,
we explore the benefits of massive MIMO aided heterogeneous
C-RAN by investigating its secrecy and EE performance. We
consider downlink transmission in a two-tier heterogeneous
C-RAN, in which the RRHs co-exist with the massive MIMO
aided macrocells. To control the inter-tier interference to an ac-
ceptable level, S-FFR is used to allocate the radio resources
appropriately. Different from [11], [14], [15], in this paper, the
RRHs and massive MIMO MBSs are spatially distributed under
the framework of stochastic geometry. While [7], [9] considered
only one single user in the network with multiple RRHs around
the user coverage area and evaluated the performance from the
standpoint of the user, we analyze the secrecy and EE of the
entire network. In summary, our contributions are that:
1) We provide a tractable analytical framework to charac-
terize the secrecy and EE performance of heterogeneous
C-RAN aided by massive MIMO. Our analysis accounts
for the key features of massive MIMO and C-RAN, i.e.,
large antenna arrays and simultaneously serving multiple
users for massive MIMO, and large numbers of RRHs and
inter-RRH interference mitigation for C-RAN.
2) We also study the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy
outage probability in this network. Our results illustrate
that accommodating more users by the massive MIMO
empowered MBSs increases the area ergodic secrecy rate
and decreases the secrecy outage probability, while it has
Fig. 1. An illustration of two-tier heterogeneous C-RAN, where the red dash
lines represent the backhual links between the macrocell base stations and BBU
pool via X2/S1 interfaces, and the green solid lines represent the fronthaul links
between the RRHs and BBU pool via optical fiber link.
negligible effect on the RRH’s performance. Deploying
large numbers of RRHs increases the area ergodic secrecy
rate and decreases the secrecy outage probability.
3) In addition, our results demonstrate that the effect of
S-FFR on the area ergodic secrecy rate of the network
can be distinct depending on the RRH density. Moreover,
the EE of the RRH tier linearly increases with their dedi-
cated radio resources, and the network EE is improved by
using more RRHs and more radio resources to be allocated
to the RRHs.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the downlink of a two-tier
heterogeneous C-RAN, where the BBU pool in the cloud is
established to coordinate the entire network. Massive MIMO
enabled MBSs of the first tier, as high power nodes (HPNs), are
connected with the BBU pool via backhaul link, while the RRHs
of the second tier, as low power nodes (LPNs), are connected
with the BBU pool via fronthaul link (optical fibre link). In this
model, we have eavesdroppers (Eves) passively intercepting
the secrecy messages without any active attacks. The locations
of Eves are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process
(HPPP) Φe with density λe .1 On the other hand, the locations of
MBSs are modeled as an independent HPPP ΦM with density
λM , and we model the locations of RRHs by an independent
HPPP ΦR with density λR .
Equipped with NM antennas, each MBS uses zero-forcing
beamforming (ZFBF) to communicate with S single-antenna
1In practice, the behavior of users is unknown and they can also act as
malicious Eves, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the locations of Eves
follow PPP [19].
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users over the same resource block (RB) (NM  S ≥ 1) us-
ing equal power assignment. The ZFBF matrix at a MBS is
W = G(GH G)−1 with the channel matrix G [20], where (·)H
denotes the Hermitian transpose. Each RRH is equipped with
a single-antenna and serves a single-antenna user over one RB.
All channels are assumed to undergo independent identically
distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh block fading. Further,
each user is assumed to be connected with its nearest BS such
that the Euclidean plane is divided into Poisson-Voronoi cells.
We consider the adoption of S-FFR for inter-tier interfer-
ence mitigation and assume that there are a total of K RBs,
the number of RBs allocated to RRHs is αK, and the number
of RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs is (1− α)K, in which α
denotes the S-FFR factor, with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Since inter-RRH
interference can be efficiently mitigated via cooperation among
RRHs, same radio resources can be shared among the RRHs in
the C-RAN [11]. For RRH transmission over the k-th RB al-
located to RRHs, the receive signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at a typical user can be expressed as
γR ,k =
PR
BoNo
hR ,kβ |Xo,R |−ηR , k = 1, . . . , αK (1)
where PR is the RRH transmit power allocated to each RB, Bo is
the bandwidth per RB, hR ,k ∼ exp(1) is the small-scale fading
channel power gain, β is a frequency dependent constant value,
which is typically set as ( c4πfc )
2 with c = 3× 108 m/s and the
carrier frequency fc , ηR is the pathloss exponent, |Xo,R | denotes
the distance between the typical user and its typical serving
RRH, and No is the power spectrum density of the noise and
the weak inter-RRH interference. For RRH transmission over
the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, the receive SINR
at a typical user is written as
γR ,ν =
PRhR ,ν β |Xo,R |−ηR
IM ,ν + BoNo
, ν = 1, . . . , (1− α)K (2)
where hR ,ν ∼ exp(1) is the small-scale fading channel power
gain, IM ,ν is the inter-tier interference from the MBSs, which
is given by
IM ,ν =
∑
∈ΦM
PM
S
h,ν β |X,M |−ηM , (3)
where PM is the MBS transmit power of each RB, h,ν ∼
Γ(S, 1) 2 is the small-scale fading interfering channel power
gain, |X,M | is the distance between the interfering MBS
 ∈ ΦM and the typical user, and ηM is the pathloss exponent.
We consider the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario where
the most malicious Eve i.e., the one with the largest SINR of the
received signal, dominates the secrecy rate [12]. Thus, for RRH
transmissions over the k-th and ν-th RB, the receive SINRs at
the most malicious Eve e∗ are given by
γe
∗
R ,k = max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R ,kβ
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeR ,k + BoNe
}
, (4)
and
γe
∗
R ,ν = max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R ,ν β
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeR ,ν + I
e
M ,ν + BoNe
}
, (5)
2Γ(·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function [21, (8.350)].
respectively, where heR ,i(i ∈ {k, ν}) ∼ exp(1) and |Xeo,R | are
the small-scale fading eavesdropping channel power gain and
the distance between the typical serving RRH and the Eve e ∈
Φe , respectively, Ne is the noise power spectrum density, IeR ,i
and IeM ,ν are the interference from the RRHs and MBSs, which
are found as
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
IeR ,i =
∑
j∈ΦR /o
PRh
e
j,iβ
∣∣Xej,R
∣∣−ηR ,
IeM ,ν =
∑
∈ΦM
PM
S
he,ν β
∣∣Xe,M
∣∣−ηM ,
(6)
where hej,i ∼ exp(1) and |Xej,R | are the small-scale fading in-
terfering channel power gain and the distance between the RRH
j ∈ ΦR/o (except the typical serving RRH) and the Eve, re-
spectively, he,ν ∼ Γ(S, 1) [20] and |Xe,M | are the small-scale
fading interfering channel power gain and the distance between
the MBS  ∈ ΦM and the Eve, respectively.
Due to the limited backhaul capacity, the inter-MBS interfer-
ence is assumed to be not mitigated. Thus, for MBS transmission
over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, the receive SINR
at a typical user is written as
γM ,ν =
PM
S gM ,ν β |Xo,M |−ηM
JM ,ν + JR ,ν + BoN1
, (7)
where gM ,ν ∼ Γ(NM − S + 1, 1) is the small-scale fading
channel power gain, |Xo,M | is the distance between the typi-
cal user and its typical serving MBS, N1 is the power spectrum
density of the noise. In (7), JM ,ν and JR ,ν are the interference
from MBSs and RRHs, which are given by
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
JM ,ν =
∑
∈ΦM /o
PM
S
g,ν β |X,M |−ηM ,
JR ,ν =
∑
j∈ΦR
PRgj,ν β |Xj,R |−ηR ,
(8)
where g,ν ∼ Γ(S, 1) and |X,M | are the small-scale fading
interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
interfering MBS  ∈ ΦM/o (except the typical serving MBS)
and the typical user, respectively, gj,ν ∼ exp(1) and |Xj,R |
are the small-scale interfering channel power gain and the dis-
tance between the interfering RBS j ∈ ΦR and the typical user,
respectively.
Similar to (5), for MBS transmission, the receive SINR γe∗M ,ν
at the most malicious Eve e∗ is given by
γe
∗
M ,ν = max
e∈Φe
{
PM
S g
e
M ,ν β
∣∣Xeo,M
∣∣−ηM
JeM ,ν + J
e
R ,ν + BoNe
}
, (9)
where geM ,ν ∼ exp(1) and |Xeo,M | are the small-scale fading
channel power gain and distance between the typical serving
MBS and the Eve, respectively. In particular, we consider the
worst-case scenario that Eves are capable of mitigating the intra-
cell interference [19]. In (9), JeM ,ν and JeR ,ν are the interference
from the MBSs and RRHs, respectively, given by
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
JeM ,ν =
∑
∈ΦM /o
PM
S
ge,ν β
∣∣Xe,M
∣∣−ηM ,
JeR ,ν =
∑
j∈ΦR
PRg
e
j,ν β
∣∣Xej,R
∣∣−ηR ,
(10)
where ge,ν ∼ Γ(S, 1) and |Xe,M | are the small-scale fading
interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
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interfering MBS  ∈ ΦM/o (except the typical serving MBS)
and Eve, respectively, and gej,ν ∼ exp(1) and |Xej,R | are
the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and
the distance between the interfering RRH j ∈ ΦR and Eve,
respectively.
B. Power Consumption Model
The total power consumption at each RRH is given by
P totalR = K
PR
εR
+ P 0R + Pfh , (11)
in which εR is the efficiency of the power amplifier, P 0R is the
static hardware power consumption of the RRH, and Pfh denotes
the power consumption of the fronthaul link.
We employ a general massive MIMO power consumption
model proposed in [22], which can clearly specify how the
power scales with the number of antennas and active users in
each macrocell. Thus, the total power consumption at each MBS
is found as
P totalM = (1− α)K
(
PM
εM
+
3∑
ρ=1
(
(S)ρΛρ,0
+ (S)(ρ−1)NMΛρ,1
))
+ P 0M + Pbh , (12)
where εM(0 < εM ≤ 1) is the efficiency of the power amplifier,
the parameters Λρ,0 and Λρ,1 depend on the transceiver chains,
coding and decoding, precoding, etc., which are detailed in
Section V, P 0M is the MBS’s static hardware power consumption,
and Pbh is the power consumption of the backhaul link.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the effects of massive MIMO and C-RAN on
the secrecy performance are studied in terms of both the area
ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Secrecy outage probability captures the probability of both
reliability and secrecy for one transmission.
A. Area Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Area ergodic secrecy rate represents the secrecy capacity lim-
itation of the network, which allows us to investigate the impacts
of different densities of RRHs and massive MIMO macrocells
on the network secrecy performance. We first study the ergodic
capacity of the channel between the typical RRH and its served
user, which is given as follows.
Theorem 1: When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs,
the ergodic capacity C¯R ,k of the channel between the typical
RRH and its served user is derived as (13) (see top of this page).
When using the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, the
ergodic capacity C¯R ,ν of the channel between the typical RRH
and its served user is derived as (14), where B(·) [·, ·] is the
incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)].3
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix A. 
We next derive the ergodic capacity of the channel between
the most malicious eavesdropper and the typical RRH, which is
given as follows:
Theorem 2: For RRH transmissions over the k-th RB and
ν-th RB, the ergodic capacity C¯e∗R ,k and C¯e
∗
R ,ν of the most ma-
licious eavesdropper’s channel are derived as (16) and (18),
respectively, in the next page.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, using Jensen’s inequal-
ity that E{max(X,Y )} ≥ max(E{x}, E{Y }), the ergodic se-
crecy rate for the typical RRH transmission over the k-th RB is
lower bounded as [14], [23]
C¯e
∗
R ,k =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe ∗R , k (x)
1 + x
dx, (16)
with
Fγe ∗R , k
(x) = exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− r
ηR x
PRβ
BoNe
− λRπΓ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)(
rηR x
) 2
η R
]
rdr
}
(17)
C¯e
∗
R ,ν =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe ∗R , ν (x)
1 + x
dx, (18)
3Note that the special functions such as the incomplete beta function have been
included in the commonly-used mathematical softwares such as Mathematica
and Matlab, and can be directly calculated.
C¯R ,k =
2π
ln 2
(λR + λM)
∫ ∞
0
e
B o N o
P R β
xη R Γ
(
0,
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
)
xe−π (λR +λM )x
2
dx, (13)
C¯R ,ν =
2π
ln 2
(λR + λM)
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x} (γ)
1 + γ
dγ
]
xe−π (λR +λM )x
2
dx, (14)
with
F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x} (γ) = e
− B o N oP R β x
η R γ
× exp
{
− λM2π
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)(
xηR γPM
PRS
)μ
(
xη R γPM
PR S
)−μ+ 2η M
ηM
B(
− x
η R −η M γ P M
P R S
)
[
μ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
]}
(15)
WANG et al.: SECRECY AND EE IN MASSIVE MIMO AIDED HETEROGENEOUS C-RAN: A NEW LOOK AT INTERFERENCE 1379
with
Fγe ∗R , ν
(x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−r
ηR x
PRβ
BoNe
− λRπΓ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)(
rηR x
) 2
η R − 2πλM
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)
×
(
rηR xPM
PRS
) 2
η M Γ
(
μ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−μ + 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ(S)
⎤
⎦rdr
⎫
⎬
⎭ (19)
RsR ,k =
[
C¯R ,k − C¯e∗R ,k
]+
, (20)
where [x]+ = max {x, 0}.
Likewise, the ergodic secrecy rate for the typical RRH trans-
mission over the ν-th RB is lower bounded as
RsR ,ν =
[
C¯R ,ν − C¯e∗R ,ν
]+
. (21)
Remark 1: From the results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, (20)
and (21), we realize that the ergodic secrecy rate for RRH trans-
mission increases with the density of RRHs, which can be ex-
plained by the facts that: 1) When deploying more RRHs in
the same area, the distance between the legitimate user and its
associated RRH is shorter, which decreases the pathloss; and 2)
more interference from RRHs is present at the eavesdroppers,
which degrades the eavesdropping channel.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the RRH tier
in the heterogeneous C-RAN is calculated as
RsR = λR
(
αKBoR
s
R ,k + (1− α)KBoRsR ,ν
)
. (22)
For MBS transmission, we have a tractable lower bound ex-
pression for the ergodic capacity of the channel between the
typical MBS and its serving user as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: For MBS transmission over the ν-th RB, the
ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical MBS and
its served user is lower bounded in closed-form as
C¯LM ,ν = log2
(
1 + exp
(
ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+ ψ (NM− S + 1)− ηM2
×(ψ(1)−ln (π (λR +λM)))−ln
(
PMβ2πλMΓ
(
2− ηM2
)
(ηM−2) (πλM +πλR)1−
η M
2
+
PRβ2πλRΓ
(
2− ηR2
)
(ηR − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
η R
2
+ BoN1
)))
, (23)
where ψ(·) is the digamma function [24]. For very large NM ,
ψ(NM − S + 1) ≈ ln(NM − S + 1) [25].
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix C. 
For MBS transmission over the ν-th RB, the ergodic capacity
C¯e
∗
M ,ν of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel is derived
as
C¯e
∗
M ,ν = E
{
log2
(
1 + γe
∗
M ,ν
)}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe ∗M , ν (x)
1 + x
dx, (24)
where Fγe ∗M , ν (x) is given by (25) Shown bottom of this page,
which can be easily obtained by following the proof of Theorem
3.
Based on Theorem 3 and (24), the ergodic secrecy rate for the
typical MBS transmission over the ν-th RB is lower bounded as
RsM ,ν =
[
C¯LM ,ν − C¯e
∗
M ,ν
]+
. (26)
Remark 2: From the results in (23), (24), and (26), we estab-
lish that the ergodic secrecy rate is improved by increasing the
number of MBS antennas, due to the fact that only the served
legitimate users can obtain the large array gains.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the MBS tier
in the heterogeneous C-RAN is determined as
RsM = λM (1− α)KBoSRsM ,ν . (27)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In the above, we have studied the secrecy capacity in the
massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN. Since Eves only
intercept the secrecy massages passively without any transmis-
sions, the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping
channels cannot be obtained by the BSs or legitimate users. In
this circumstance, the BSs set the transmission rate R consist-
ing of the secrecy codewords and non-secrecy codewords, and
a constant rate of the secrecy codewords Rs (Rs ≤ R). Secrecy
outage is declared when the targeted secrecy rate Rs cannot be
guaranteed.
1) Delay-Limited Mode: In the delay-limited mode, a rate
R is set under certain connection outage constraint. For RRH
transmission over the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, given a
distance |X0,R | = d0 between a typical RRH and its serving
user, the connection outage probability is given by
P coR ,k (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + γR ,k ) < R)
= 1− exp
(
−BoNo
PRβ
dηRo
(
2R − 1)
)
. (28)
For RRH transmission over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and
MBSs, the connection outage probability is
P coR ,ν (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + γR ,ν ) < R)
= 1− F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=do }
(
2R − 1) , (29)
where F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x}(·) is given by (15).
Fγe ∗M , ν
(x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−Sr
ηM x
PMβ
B0N1 − λRπ (PRβ)
2
η R Γ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)(
SrηM x
PMβ
) 2
η R
− 2πλM
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)
(rηM x)
2
η M
Γ
(
μ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−μ + 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ (S)
⎤
⎦ rdr
⎫
⎬
⎭ (25)
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Remark 3: From (28) and (29), we see that when a typical
RRH transmits information to its served user, deploying more
RRHs in its surrounding area has no effect on the quality of
connectivity, since the inter-RRH interference is mitigated.
Corollary 1: Given a distance |Xo,R | = do and the connec-
tion outage probability threshold σ, the typical RRH transmis-
sion rate over the k-th RB allocated to RRHs is given by
R = log2
(
1− PRβ
BoNod
ηR
o
ln (1− σ)
)
, (30)
and the typical RRH transmission rate over the ν-th RB shared
by RRHs and MBSs satisfies
R ≥ log2
(
1 +
PRS
PMd
ηR
o
Δ
η M
2
1
)
, (31)
with
Δ1 = − ηMΓ (S) ln (1− σ)
2πλM
∑S
μ=1
(
S
μ
)
Γ
(
μ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−μ + 2ηM + S
) .
(32)
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix D. 
Similar to (29), given a distance |Xo,M | = do between a typ-
ical MBS and its served user, we obtain the connection outage
probability of MBS transmission as
PcoM ,ν (R) = 1− F¯γM , ν |{|Xo ,M |=do }
(
2R − 1) , (33)
where F¯γM , ν |{|Xo ,M |=do }(·) is the complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) of the receive SINR γM ,ν at the
MBS. However, the exact expression for F¯γM , ν |{|Xo ,M |=do }(·)
involves higher order derivatives of laplace transform using Faa`
di Bruno’s formula [26], which becomes inefficient for large
number of MBS antennas. By the law of large numbers, i.e.,
gM ,ν ≈ NM − S + 1 as NM is large, and employing Gil-Pelaez
theorem [27], we have
F¯γM , ν |{|Xo ,M |=do } (γ) = Pr
(
PM
S (NM − S + 1)βd−ηMo
JM ,ν + JR ,ν + BoN1
> γ
)
= Pr
(
JM ,ν +JR ,ν <
(
PM
Sγ
(NM−S + 1)βd−ηMo −BoN1
))
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ ∞
0
Im
[
e
−jw
(
P M β
S d
η M
o γ
(NM −S+1)−Bo N1
)
ϕ∗ (w)
]
w
dw,
(34)
where j =
√−1, ϕ(w) is the conjugate of the characteris-
tic function given by (35) shown bottom of this page, which
can be easily obtained by following the similar approach in
Appendix A. In (35), 2F1 [·, ·; ·; ·] is the Gauss hypergeometric
function [21, (9.142)].
Secrecy outage occurs when the equivocation rate of Eve
is lower than the secrecy rate Rs . Thus, the secrecy outage
probability can be written in a general form as
Ps = Pr
(
R− log2
(
1 + γe
∗
ϑ,i
)
< Rs
)
= 1− Fγe ∗ϑ , i
(
2R−R s − 1) , (36)
where Fγe ∗ϑ , i (·) is the CDF of the SINR γ
e∗
ϑ,i at the most malicious
Eve. Note that here, Fγe ∗ϑ , i (·) is given by (17), (19) and (25) for
RRH transmissions (ϑ = R, i ∈ {k, ν}) and MBS transmissions
(ϑ = M, i = ν), respectively.
Remark 4: From (36), we see that for eavesdroppers, de-
ploying more RRHs and MBSs results in more interference,
which degrades the eavesdropping channel, thereby decreasing
the secrecy outage probability.
2) Delay-Tolerant Mode: In the delay-tolerant mode, coding
can be operated over a sufficient number of independent channel
realizations to experience the whole ensemble of the channel,
and therefore the transmission rate R can be set as an arbitrary
value less than or equal to the ergodic capacity of the channel
between the legitimate user and its serving RRH/MBS [14]. The
secrecy outage occurs when the targeted ergodic secrecy rate Rs
cannot be satisfied, i.e.,
R−Re < Rs , (37)
where Re denotes the ergodic capacity of the most mali-
cious eavesdropper’s channel. When intercepting the RRH
transmission, Re = C¯e
∗
R ,i(i ∈ {k, ν}) given by (16) and (18)
respectively; and when intercepting the MBS transmission,
Re = C¯e
∗
M ,ν given by (24). As mentioned in Remark 4, Re de-
creases with increasing the densities of RRHs and MBSs, due
to more severe interference.
It is indicated from (37) that given a secrecy rate Rs , the
rate R should be set as large as possible to avoid the secrecy
outage. Based on Theorem 1, i) RRH transmission over the
k-th RB allocated to RRHs, the transmission rate R at RRH
(bits/s/Hz) satisfies R ≤ C¯R ,k with C¯R ,k given by (13), and ii)
RRH transmission over the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and
MBSs, R at RRH satisfies R ≤ C¯R ,ν with C¯R ,ν given by (14).
Based on Theorem 3, for MBS transmission over the ν-th RB
shared by the RRHs and MBSs, The value for R at MBS can be
at least set as R = C¯LM ,ν with C¯LM ,ν given by (23).
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
One of the 5G goals is to achieve 10x reduction in energy
consumption [28]. As such, EE is a very important performance
ϕ (w) = exp
(
− 2πλR jwPRβd
2−ηR
o
ηR − 2 2F1
[
1,
ηR − 2
ηR
; 2− 2
ηR
;−jwPRβd−ηRo
]
− λM2π
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)(
jw
PM
S
β
)μ
×
(−jwPMS β
)−μ+ 2η M
ηM
B(−jw P MS βd
−η M
o
)
[
μ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
])
(35)
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Fig. 2. Effects of massive MIMO on the area ergodic secrecy rate: λM =
(5002 × π)−1m−2 , λe = 10−5 m−2 , ηM = 3.0, ηR = 3.6, and α = 0.5.
metric. In this section, we proceed to examine the EE concern
in the massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN.4
The EE for transmission from a typical RRH is given by
EERRH =
throughput
PowerConsumption
=
αKBoC¯R ,k + (1− α)KBoC¯R ,ν
P totalR
, (38)
where C¯R ,k and C¯R ,ν are given by (13) and (14), respectively,
based on Theorem 1. In the RRH tier, transmission over RBs
that are only allocated to RRHs plays a dominant role in the
overall throughput [11], compared to using RBs shared by the
RRHs and MBSs. As a consequence, (38) can be approximately
evaluated as
EERRH
(a)≈ αBoC¯R ,k
PR
εR
, (39)
where (a) is obtained by omitting the power consumptions from
static hardware and fronthaul link, compared to the RRH trans-
mit power. It is implied from (39) that the EE for RRH trans-
mission can be linearly improved by allocating more RBs to the
RRHs. From (13), we note that C¯R ,k increases with density of
RRHs and MBSs. Hence we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2: EE for RRH transmission is improved by in-
creasing the density of RRHs and MBSs in the heterogeneous
C-RAN, due to the fact that the distance between the user and
its associated RRH is shorter, hence increasing the throughput.
4Note that because the CSI of the eavesdropping channels is unknown, joint
design of combining both EE and secrecy is not feasible.
Likewise, the EE for transmission from a typical MBS can at
least achieve
EEMBS =
(1− α)KBoSC¯LM ,ν
P totalM
(b)≈ BoSC¯
L
M ,ν
PM
εM
+
∑3
ρ=1
(
(S)ρΛρ,0 + (S)
(ρ−1)NMΛρ,1
) ,
(40)
where P totalM represents the total power consumption at each
MBS given by (12), (b) is obtained by the fact that the power
consumptions from static hardware and backhaul link are negli-
gible compared to the massive MIMO processing. In (40), C¯LM ,ν
is given by (23), based on Theorem 3. From (40), we see that
S-FFR has negligible effect on the EE of MBS transmission.
In light of the aforementioned, we conclude that the EE of
the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN is improved
by increasing the RRH density and RBs only used by RRHs.
We next evaluate the EE of this network. Using the Theorem 1
and Theorem 3 in Section III, we know that the EE of the massive
MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN can at lease achieve
EENet =
Area throughput of the network
AreaPowerConsumption of the network
=
λRαKBoC¯R ,k + (1− α)KBo
(
λR C¯R ,ν + λMSC¯LM ,ν
)
λRP totalR + λMP
total
M
.
(41)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the
secrecy and EE of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous
C-RAN (abbreviated as Het C-RAN in the figures). We con-
sider a circular region with radius 1× 104 m. Such a network
is assumed to operate at a carrier frequency of 1 GHz, with the
MBS transmit power PM = 40 dBm, the RRH transmit power
PR = 30 dBm, the RB bandwidth B0 = 800 kHz, and the total
number of RBsK = 25. The power spectrum densities areN0 =
N1 = Ne = −162 dBm/Hz [6]. The static hardware power con-
sumption for RRH and HPN are P 0R = 0.1 W and P 0M = 10 W,
respectively, and the power consumption of the fronthaul link
and backhaul link are Pfh = Pbh = 0.2 W. We set the coeffi-
cients for efficiency of power amplifier εR = εM = 0.3, and the
coefficients for power consumption under ZFBF precoding in
(12) as P 0M = 4 W, Λ1,0 = 4.8, Λ2,0 = 0, Λ3,0 = 2.08× 10−8,
Λ1,1 = 1, Λ2,1 = 9.5× 10−8 and Λ3,1 = 6.25× 10−8 [22]. In
the simulation results, the values of MBS and RRH density
are set based on the macro inter-site distance (ISD) in 3GPP
model [29].
A. The Effects of Massive MIMO
Fig. 2 analyzes the effects of massive MIMO on the area
ergodic secrecy rate. The analytical curves for area ergodic se-
crecy rate of the RRH tier were obtained from (22), which
have a precise match to the results obtained using the Monte-
Carlo simulations marked by ‘◦’. The lower bound curves
for area ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier were obtained
from using (27), which can efficiently predict the performance
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability for
MBS transmission in delay-limited mode: R = 8 bits/s/Hz, Rs = 0.3R, do =
50 m, λM = (5002 × π)−1m−2 , λR = 20× λM , ηM = 3.0 and ηR = 3.6.
Fig. 4. The ergodic capacity C¯ e∗ of the most malicious eavesdropper’s chan-
nel and the ergodic capacity C¯M of the macrocell user’s channel for MBS trans-
mission in delay-tolerant mode: λM = (5002 × π)−1m−2 , λR = 20× λM ,
λe = 10−5 m−2 , ηM = 3.3.
behavior. As mentioned in Remark 2 of Section III-A, we ob-
serve that the area ergodic secrecy rate increases with the num-
ber of MBS antennas, due to more array gains obtained by
the legitimate user. Increasing the number of served users can
also significantly improve the ergodic secrecy rate. The area
ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier remains unchanged with
increasing the number of MBS antennas, since employing more
MBS antennas will not cause more interference in the network.
Nevertheless, it will substantially increase with the density
of RRHs.
Fig. 3 provides the results for the secrecy outage probability
and connection outage probability of MBS transmission operat-
ing in delay-limited mode. With increasing the number of served
users, the secrecy outage probability decreases and the connec-
tion outage probability increases. The reason is that the transmit
Fig. 5. Effects of massive MIMO on the EE: λM = (5002 × π)−1m−2 , λR =
20× λM , ηM = 3.2, ηR = 3.6, and α = 0.5.
Fig. 6. Effects of RRH density on area ergodic secrecy rate: λo = (5002 ×
π)−1 m−2 , λe = 10−5 m−2 , NM = 400, S = 30, ηM = 3.0, ηR = 3.6, and
α = 0.7.
power allocated to each user data stream decreases when serv-
ing more users at the MBS, which in turn decreases the receive
SINR at both the legitimate user and eavesdroppers. To decrease
the connection outage probability without altering the secrecy
outage probability, MBSs can be equipped with more antennas
to provide larger array gains for the legitimate users. In addi-
tion, it is obvious that more eavesdroppers will deteriorate the
secrecy performance.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic capacity C¯e∗ of the most mali-
cious eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity C¯M of
the macrocell user’s channel for MBS transmission in delay-
tolerant mode. When adding more MBS antennas, C¯e∗ is
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(a)
Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability for RRH
transmission in delay-limited mode. (a) Rs = 0.2R, do = 30 m, λo = (5002 ×
π)−1 m−2 , λe = 10−4 m−2 , ηR = 3.6, (b) Rs = 0.2R, do = 30 m, λM =
λo = (5002 × π)−1 m−2 , λe = 10−4 m−2 , NM = 200, S = 15, ηM = 3.0,
and ηR = 3.6
unaltered and C¯M experiences a substantial increase, since only
the legitimate macrocell users can obtain the array gains. Ad-
ditionally, serving more users at the MBS decreases C¯e∗ and
C¯M , because of lower transmit power per user data stream at the
MBS as mentioned in Fig 3.
Fig. 5 illustrates the effects of massive MIMO on the EE.
Results indicate that the EE of MBS transmission is improved
by serving more users at the MBS, which is attributed to the
fact that more multiplexing gain is achieved. Although adding
more antennas at the MBS can provide a large array gain, there
is a significant increase in power consumption resulting from
massive MIMO baseband processing, which decreases the EE
of MBS transmission. In addition, the RRHs achieve higher
EE than the MBSs, as they use lower transmit power and do
not consume power for baseband processing, and results also
Fig. 8. The ergodic capacity C¯ e∗ of the most malicious eavesdropper’s chan-
nel and the ergodic capacity C¯R of the C-RAN user’s channel for RRH transmis-
sion in delay-tolerant mode: λM = λo = (5002 × π)−1 m−2 , λe = 10−4 m−2 ,
NM = 200, S = 15, ηM = 3.5, and ηR = 3.2.
Fig. 9. Effects of RRH density on the EE: λo = (5002 × π)−1m−2 , NM =
400, S = 30, ηM = 3.0, ηR = 3.6, and α = 0.7.
demonstrate that massive MIMO has negligible effect on the
EE of RRH transmission.
B. The Effects of RRH Density
Fig. 6 shows the effects of RRH density on area ergodic se-
crecy rate. We observe that when more RRHs are deployed,
there is a substantial increase in the area ergodic secrecy rate of
the RRH tier, as illustrated in Remark 1 of Section III-A. The
area ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier can also increase
with the density of RRH, since users with far-away MBSs
will be offloaded to the RRHs. RRH tier can achieve higher
area ergodic secrecy rate than the massive MIMO aided MBS
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Fig. 10. Effects of S-FFR on area ergodic secrecy rate: λM = (5002 ×
π)−1m−2 , λe = 5 ∗ 10−5 m−2 , NM = 400, S = 25, ηM = 3.5, and ηR =
3.3.
tier when the RRHs are denser than the MBSs. In addition,
slightly increasing the number of massive MIMO macrocells
brings large improvement in the area ergodic secrecy rate of
the MBS tier because more users can be served, and it also
improves the area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier due to
the fact that users with far-away RRHs will be offloaded to
the MBSs.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy outage probability and connection
outage probability of RRH transmission in delay-limited mode.
Specifically, Fig. 7(a) focuses on the performance when RRH
transmissions operate over the RBs only allocated to RRHs,
while Fig. 7(b) concentrates on the performance when RRH
transmissions operate over the RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs.
As stated in Remark 4 of Section III-B, the secrecy outage proba-
bility experiences a massive decline when increasing the density
of RRHs, due to more severe interference on the Eves but the
connection outage probability is unaltered since the inter-RRH
interference is mitigated in the C-RAN, as mentioned in Remark
3. Compared with the use of RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs,
RRH achieves better performance by using the RBs only used
by RRHs, due to the absence of inter-tier interference in these
RBs.
Fig. 8 shows the ergodic capacity C¯e∗ of the most mali-
cious eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity C¯R of the
C-RAN user’s channel for RRH transmission in delay-tolerant
mode. As suggested in Remark 1, deploying more RRHs
can significantly decrease C¯e∗ and increase C¯R . For RRH
transmission over the RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, in-
terference from the MBS tier has a large negative impact
on the performance at the legitimate users, however, its im-
pact on the degradation of the most malicious eavesdrop-
per’s channel is limited compared to more interference from
dense RRHs.
Fig. 9 shows the effects of RRH density on the EE. As
mentioned in Corollary 2 of Section IV, when increasing the
density of RRHs, the EE of RRH transmission is significantly
Fig. 11. Effects of S-FFR on the EE: λM = (5002 × π)−1m−2 , λe = 5 ∗
10−5 m−2 , NM = 400, S = 25, ηM = 3.5, and ηR = 3.3.
improved. Increasing the density of MBSs improves the
EE of RRH transmission but decreases the EE of MBS
transmission, since users with far-away RRHs are offloaded
to the MBSs. The EE of the Het C-RAN decreases with
increasing the density of MBSs, due to the fact that power
consumption of the network is significantly boosted by using
more massive MIMO MBSs. Since RRHs achieve higher EE,
more RRHs should be deployed in the Het C-RAN to enhance
the EE.
C. The Effects of S-FFR
Results in Fig. 10 demonstrate the effects of S-FFR on area
ergodic secrecy rate. It is obvious that with more RBs allocated
to the RRHs, the area ergodic secrecy rate increases for the
RRH tier, and decreases for the MBS tier. The RRH tier can
achieve higher area ergodic secrecy rate than the MBS tier,
when the density of RRHs and the allocated RBs are large. More
importantly, it is implied that the effect of S-FFR on the area
ergodic secrecy rate of the network can be distinct depending
on the RRH density.
Finally, Fig. 11 provides the effects of S-FFR on the EE.
As mentioned in section IV, the EE for RRH transmission is
indeed linearly improved by allocating more RBs to the RRHs
without the harm of inter-tier interference. S-FFR indeed has
little effect on the EE of MBS transmission. Therefore, the EE
of the network increases with the RRH density and RBs only
used by RRHs, as shown in this figure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the physical layer secrecy and
EE in the two-tier massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN,
where massive MIMO empowered macrocell BSs and RRHs co-
exist. The implementation of S-FFR was utilized to suppress the
inter-tier interference. We first studied the impacts of massive
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MIMO and C-RAN on the secrecy performance in terms of
the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Then we evaluated the EE in such networks. Our results demon-
strated that both C-RAN and massive MIMO can significantly
enhance the secrecy performance. The implementation of C-
RAN with low power cost RRHs improves EE of the networks
substantially.
APPENDIX A
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, the ergodic
capacity of the channel between the typical RRH and its served
user is given by
C¯R ,k = E {log2 (1 + γR ,k )}
=
∫ ∞
0
EhR , k
{
log2
(
1 +
PRβ
BoNo
hR ,kx
−ηR
)}
f|Xo ,R | (x) dx.
(A.1)
Considering that hR ,k ∼ exp(1), we further have
C¯R ,k =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
{∫ ∞
0
1
1 + t
e
− B o N oP R β x
η R t
dt
}
f|Xo ,R | (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
e
B o N o
P R β
xη R Γ
(
0,
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
)
f|Xo ,R | (x) dx,
(A.2)
where f|Xo ,R |(x) is the probability density function (PDF) of the
distance between the typical RRH and its intended user, using
the similar approach in [30], f|Xo ,R |(x) is given by
f|Xo ,R | (x) =
2πλR
AR xe
−π (λR +λM )x2 , (A.3)
where AR = λRλR +λM is the probability that a user is associated
with the RRH. By plugging (A.3) into (A.2), we get (13).
When using the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, the
ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical RRH and
its served user is given by
C¯R ,ν = E {log2 (1 + γR ,ν )}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
E|Xo ,R |=x {log2 (1 + γR ,ν )} f|Xo ,R | (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x} (γ)
1 + γ
dγ
]
f|Xo ,R | (x) dx,
(A.4)
where F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x}(γ) is the CCDF of γR ,ν given a distance
|Xo,R | = x, which is calculated as
F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=x} (γ) = Pr
(
PRhR ,ν βx
−ηR
IM ,ν + BoNo
> γ
)
= e−
B o N o
P R β
xη R γEΦM
{
e
− 1P R β x
η R γ IM , ν
}
= e−
B o N o
P R β
xη R γLIM , ν
(
1
PRβ
xηR γ
)
, (A.5)
where LIM , ν (·) is the laplace transform of the PDF of IM ,ν , and
is given by
LIM , ν (s) = E
{
exp
{
−
(
∑
∈ΦM
PM
S
h,ν β |X,M |−ηM
)
s
}}
(b)
= exp
{
−
∫ ∞
x
(
1− 1(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S
)
λM2πrdr
}
(c)
= exp
(
−λM2π
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)∫ ∞
x
(
PM
S β
)μ
sμ (r−ηM )
μ
(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S rdr
)
= exp
{
− λM2π
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)(
s
PM
S
β
)μ (−sPMS β
)−μ+ 2η M
ηM
B(−s P MS βx−η M
)
[
μ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
]}
, (A.6)
where (b) is obtained by using the generating functional of
PPP [31], (c) results from using Binomial expansion, B(·) [·, ·]
is the incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)]. By pulling (A.6)
and (A.5) together, we get (15). Substituting (A.3) into (A.4),
we also get (14).
APPENDIX B
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
The ergodic capacity C¯e∗R ,i (i ∈ {k, ν}) of the most malicious
eavesdropper’s channel is written as
C¯e
∗
R ,i = E
{
log2
(
1 + γe
∗
R ,i
)}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe ∗R , i (x)
1 + x
dx, (B.1)
where Fγe ∗R , i (x) denotes the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of γe∗R ,i .
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Based on (4), the CDF of γe∗R ,k is calculated as
Fγe ∗R , k
(x) = Pr
(
γe
∗
R ,k < x
)
= Pr
(
max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R ,kβ
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeR ,k + BoNe
}
< x
)
= EΦe
{ ∏
e∈Φe
Pr
(
PRh
e
R ,k β
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeR ,k + BoNe
< x |Φe
)}
. (B.2)
Using the generating functional of the PPP Φe , Fγe ∗R , k (x) can
be further derived as
Fγe ∗R , k
(x) = exp
{
−λe
∫
R2
(
1− Pr
(
PRh
e
R ,k βr
−ηR
IeR ,k + BoNe
< x
))
dr
}
= exp
{
− λe
∫
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EΦM
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IeR ,k + BoNe
)]}}
dr
}
(a)
= exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−r
ηR x
PRβ
BoNe
]
LI eR , k
(
rηR x
PRβ
)
rdr
}
,
(B.3)
where (a) results from using the polar-coordinate system,
LI eR , k (·) is the laplace transform of the PDF of IeR ,k .
Likewise, the CDF of γe∗R ,ν is calculated as
Fγe ∗R , ν
(x) = Pr
(
γe
∗
R ,ν < x
)
= Pr
(
max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R ,ν β
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeR ,ν + I
e
M ,ν + BoNe
}
< x
)
= EΦe
{
∏
e∈Φe
Pr
(
PRh
e
R ,ν β
∣∣Xeo,R
∣∣−ηR
IeM ,ν + I
e
R ,ν + BoNe
< x |Φe
)}
= exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−r
ηR x
PRβ
BoNe
]
LI eR , ν
(
rηR x
PRβ
)
LI eM , ν
(
rηR x
PRβ
)
rdr
}
,
(B.4)
where LI eR , ν (·) and LI eM , ν (·) are the laplace transforms of the
PDFs of IeR ,ν and IeM ,ν , respectively.
By using the Slivnyak’s theorem and the generating functional
of the PPP ΦR , LI eR , i (·) (i ∈ {k, ν}) is given by
LI eR , i (s) = E
{
exp
(−sIeR ,i
)}
= exp
(
−2πλR
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
(1 + sPRβr−ηR )
)
rdr
)
= exp
(
−λRπ (PRβ)
2
η R Γ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)
s
2
η R
)
.
(B.5)
Similarly, IeM ,ν is given by
LI eM , ν (s) = exp
[
−2πλM
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S
)
rdr
]
= exp
[
− 2πλM
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)(
s
PM
S
β
) 2
η M
Γ
(
μ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−μ + 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ (S)
]
. (B.6)
Substituting (B.5) into (B.3), we get Fγe ∗R , k (·) as (17). Then,
substituting (B.5) and (B.6) into (B.4), we get Fγe ∗R , ν (·) as (19).
APPENDIX C
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 3
The ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical MBS
and its served user is written as
C¯M ,ν = E {log2 (1 + γM ,ν )} . (C.1)
By using Jensen’s inequality, a tight lower bound for C¯M ,ν is
given by [25]
C¯LM ,ν = log2
(
1 + eZ3 +Z4
)
, (C.2)
where
Z3 = E
{
ln
(
PM
S
gM ,ν β |Xo,M |−ηM
)}
, (C.3)
and
Z4 = E
{
ln
(
1
JM ,ν + JR ,ν + BoN1
)}
. (C.4)
We first calculate Z3 as
Z3 = ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+ E {ln (gM ,ν )} − ηME {ln (|Xo,M |)} .
(C.5)
Considering that gM ,ν ∼ Γ(NM − S + 1, 1), E{ln(gM ,ν )} is
given by
E {ln (gM ,ν )} =
∫ ∞
0
xNM −S e−x
(NM − S)! ln (x) dx
(a)
= ψ (NM − S + 1) , (C.6)
where (a) results from using ∫∞0 xv−1e−μx lnxdx =
μ−vΓ(v)(ψ(v)− lnμ) [21, (4.352.1)]. Then, E{ln(|Xo,M |)} is
derived as
E {ln (|Xo,M |)}
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0
ln (x) f|Xo ,M | (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
ln (x)
2πλM
AM xe
−π (λR +λM )x2 dx
=
1
2
(ψ (1)− ln (π (λR + λM))) . (C.7)
In (b) above, f|Xo ,M |(x) is the PDF of the distance between
the typical MBS and its intended user, which can be directly
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obtained following (A.3), and AM = λMλR +λM is the probability
that a user is associated with the MBS. By substituting (C.6)
and (C.7) into (C.5), we obtain Z3 as
Z3 = ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+ ψ (NM − S + 1)
− ηM
2
(ψ (1)− ln (π (λR + λM))) . (C.8)
From (C.4), considering the convexity of ln( 11+x ) and using
Jensen’s inequality, we derive the lower bound on the Z4 as
Z4 ≥ Z¯4 = ln
(
1
E {JM ,ν }+ E {JR ,ν }+ BoN1
)
. (C.9)
Then, we have
E {JM ,ν } =
∫ ∞
0
E
⎧
⎨
⎩
∑
∈ΦM /o
PM
S
g,ν β |X,M |−ηM
⎫
⎬
⎭f|Xo ,M |(x)dx
(c)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
PMβ2πλM
∫ ∞
x
r1−ηM dr
)
f|Xo ,M | (x) dx
=
PMβ2πλMΓ
(
2− ηM2
)
(ηM − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
η M
2
, (C.10)
where (c) results from using Campbell’s theorem [32]. Likewise,
E{JR ,ν } is calculated as
E {JR ,ν } =
∫ ∞
0
E
⎧
⎨
⎩
∑
j∈ΦR
PRgj,ν β |Xj,R |−ηR
⎫
⎬
⎭ f|Xo ,M | (x) dx
=
PRβ2πλRΓ
(
2− ηR2
)
(ηR − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
η R
2
. (C.11)
Substituting (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.2), we obtain (23).
APPENDIX D
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY III-B1
When the connection outage constraint P coR ,k (R) = σ, using
(28), we can easily get (30).
For connection outage constraint on the RRH transmis-
sion over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, namely
P coR ,ν (R) = σ, we have
F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=do }
(
2R − 1) = 1− σ. (D.1)
Since the noise can be ignored compared with the inter-tier
interference from MBSs, based on (A.5) and (A.6), we consider
the worse case that interferers are located everywhere in the
plane and derive the lower bound for F¯γR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=do }(·) as
F¯ LγR , ν |{|Xo ,R |=do } (γ)
= exp
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−
∫ ∞
0
⎛
⎜⎝1− 1(
1 + PM d
η R
o γ
PR S
r−ηM
)S
⎞
⎟⎠ λM2πrdr
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
= exp
(
−2πλM
(
PMd
ηR
o
PRS
γ
) 2
η M
S∑
μ=1
(
S
μ
)
×
Γ
(
μ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−μ + 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ (S)
⎞
⎠ . (D.2)
Substituting (D.1) into (D.2), after some manipulations, we
obtain (31).
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